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Justice Lucinda M. Finley delivered the opinion of the Court.

been used as
Women's ability to becom e pregnant and bear childre n has long
ndence , intela rationale to deprive them of the economic security and indepe
from full
come
can
that
t
respec
and
lectual development, societal opportunity
policies
er
employ
of
participation in the workplace. Throu gh the operation
ions or
profess
and federal and state laws, women have been barred from certain
in Women's Rights,
'' See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Synergy of Equality and Privacy
2002 U. Chi. Legal F. 137, 147-54 (2002).
the Court for the first time
' 6 In Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003),
es may violate the
stereotyp
sex-role
on
based
held that legal regulation of pregnant women
Reva B. Siegel,
also
See
.
Geduldig
overrule
explicitly
not
did
but
Clause,
Equal Protection
ination in
Discrim
cy
Pregnan
to
h
Approac
You've Come A Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist's New
interfuture
for
Hibbs
of
ions
implicat
ng
(discussi
(zoo6)
1882--97
1871,
Rev.
Hibbs, 58 Stan. L
pretations of Geduldig).

Geduldig v. Aiello
subjected to limited work hours due to assumptions about the implications of
their maternal role. Bradwellv. Illinois, 83 U.S.130 (1873) (prohibiting a woman
from the practice of law); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (limiting the
number of hours women can work in laundries). They have been subjected to
mandatory leave or discharge due to pregnancy. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Struck v. Secretary o{Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir.
1971), vacated and remanded to consider mootness, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972). They
have been barred from returning to work for several months after childbirth.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 634-35. They have been denied seniority accumulation
while on forced periods of leave; they have been excluded from utilizing sick
leave benefits or from receiving unemployment compensation when absent
from work due to the effects of pregnancy; they have often been denied coverage under employer-provided health insurance for health care costs related
to pregnancy. See Citizens' Advisory Council On The Status of Women, Job
Related Maternity Benefits (1970); Colquitt Walker, Sex Discrimination in
Government Benefits Programs, 23 Hastings L.J. 277, 282-85 (1971); Br. for Am.
Fed'n of Labor and Council of Indus. Org. as Amicus Curiae; Br. for ACLU
as Amicus Curiae; Trudy Hayden, Punishing Pregnancy: Discrimination in
Education, Employment and Credit (ACLU 1973).
Indeed, it is fair to say that most of the disadvantages imposed on women
in the workforce derive from the capacity of women to become pregnant and
from the societal and legal responses to the real or supposed implications of
this reality. Assumptions and stereotypes about the physical and emotional
effects of pregnancy and motherhood, about the appropriate role of women
in society and the workplace stemming from the physical fact of childbearing,
and about the perceived response of women to childbearing, have contributed
more than any other factor to the disadvantageous treatment of women in the
workplace and to their economically subordinated position in society.
It is in light of this historical context and contemporary reality that this
case comes before us, and requires us squarely to decide whether exclusionary
workplace policies constitute discrimination on the basis of sex when they are
based on pregnancy and operate to disadvantage women. If so, does the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibit
disadvantageous treatment of pregnancy and related conditions that may render women temporarily unable to work?
Plaintiff-Appellees are four women who became pregnant, were temporarily m;table to work due to physical conditions related to their pregnancies,
and were ineligible for payments under California's temporary disability insurance system solely because their temporary disabilities were due to pregnancy.
California Unemployment Insurance Code S2626 excludes from its otherwise
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comprehensive disability insurance coverage "any injury or illness caused by
or arising in connection with pregnancy up to the termination of pregnancy
and for a period of 28 days thereafter." Plaintiffs challenged this exclusion as a
violation of their right to the equal protection of the law.
II

Concerned about the economic hardship that workers can experience when
they are temporarily unable to work due to physical or mental conditions,
California enacted a comprehensive disability insurance program in 1946.
The program's stated purpose is "to compensate in part for the wage loss sustained by individuals unemployed because of sickness or injury and to reduce
to a minimum the suffering caused by unemployment resulting therefrom."
Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code S2601. The statute further commands that "it shall
be construed liberally in aid of its declared purpose to mitigate the evils and
burdens which fall on the unemployed" and their families. Id.
The disability program is funded by mandatory employee contributions. At
present, employees must contribute 1 percent of their salary up to a maximum
of$85 per year. Id. SS984, 985, 2901. In order to be eligible to receive benefits,
an employee must have contributed 1 percent of a minimum income of $300
during a one-year base period previous to the time of disability. I d. S2652. For
up to twenty-six weeks, an eligible employee may receive a basic benefit level
currently varying between $25 and $119 per week depending on the amount
earned during the base period. Id. SS2653, 2655. Benefits can begin after the
eighth day of disability, or can begin on the first day of hospitalization if the
employee is hospitalized. Id. SS 2627(b), 2802. Claims must be substantiated
by the affidavit of a licensed medical practitioner attesting to the disability, and
employees may also be required to submit to reasonable examinations. Id. SS
. 2627(c), (d), 2708,2710.
Reflecting its broad prophylactic purpose of buffering the adverse economic impact of being temporarily unable to work regardless of the reason,
the program provides benefits for incapacities stemming from virtually all
conditions or activities. The sole exception is that during pregnancy and for
twenty-eight days after childbirth or pregnancy termination, women may
not receive benefits for any temporary work incapacity stemming from the
pregnancy itself or from any illness or injury caused by or arising in connection with the pregnancy. Id. S 2626.•1 Plaintiff-Appellees, all of whom
'7

The legislation establishing the disability insurance program restricts the eligibility of those
who have been judicially ordered to be confined to an institution due to drug addiction
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were denied disability benefits· when they experienced temporary disabilities in connection with their pregnancies, challenge the disadvantageous
treatment they suffered as a result of S2626 as a denial of their right to the
equal protection of the law.
Plaintiff Carolyn Aiello, who is self-supporting, had to stop work as a
hairdresser in late June 1972, when she had to be hospitalized because she
was suffering from an ectopic pregnancy. After surgery to terminate this
life-threatening condition, her physician advised her to remain off work for
over a month to recuperate. She promptly applied for temporary disability
benefits, which were denied solely because her disability arose in connection
with pregnancy.
Plaintiff Augustina Armendariz works as a secretary, and she is the sole eco- ·
nomic support for herself, her husband, and their young son. In early May
1972, she began to bleed while pregnant, and had to be rushed to the hospital,
where she suffered a miscarriage. Her physician ordered her not to return to
work until the end of May. She applied for temporary disability benefits, and
her claim was also denied on the sole basis that her disability arose in connection with pregnancy.
Plaintiff Elizabeth Johnson works as an operator for the telephone company, and her job provides the primary economic support for her household,
which includes herself and her five-year-old son. Ms. Johnson entered the
hospital on May 22, 1972, after experiencing intense abdominal pain, swelling in the legs, back pain, and general illness. She was diagnosed as having a
tubal pregnancy and, in order to save her life, an operation was performed to
terminate the pregnancy. She was discharged from the hospital on May 30,
and her physician advised her not to return to work until July 10. Her disability
insurance claim was den.ied for the sole reason that her disability was disqualified by S2626's pregnancy exclusion.
The final individual plaintiff, Jacqueline Jaramillo, works to provide the
sole economic support for herself, her husband who is a student, and their
infant. While she did not experience any of the life-threatening pregnancy
complications endured by the other plaintiffs, she did require a period of rest
and recuperation after her normal vaginal delivery, during which she could
not work. She seeks disability benefits for the period she was incapacitated
from working due to the delivery of her child.

or sexual psychopathology. Id. S 2678. At oral argument, however, counsel for Appellant
California conceded that such judicial orders are artifacts no longer used, so that this exclusion does not in fact exclude anyone. Tr. of Oral Arg.
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district court ruling here, and the lower court rejected California's motion
to reconsider its decision in light of Rentzer. The state accepted the statutory construction adopted by the court in Rentter, and subsequently issued
administrative guidelines that the exclusion of pregnancy-related conditions in S 2626 applied only to exclude payment for "maternity benefits,"
i.e., hospitalization and disability benefits for normal pregnancy, delivery,
and recuperation. Based on Rentzer and the new administrative guidelines,
Appellees Aiello, Armendariz, and Johnson, who suffered from the disabling
effects of ectopic pregnancies and miscarriage, became eligible for benefits, and their claims have now been paid. Their claims are thus moot, and
only the challenge of Ms. Jaramillo continues to present a live controversy.
Consequently, the issue we must decide in this appeal is whether the exclusion from California's otherwise comprehensive disability insurance program
of temporary disabilities associated with normal pregnancy and childbirth
constitutes a sex-based exclusion that disadvantages women and perpetuates their economic and social subordination, and thus violates the Equal
Protection Clause.

IV

To determine whether California's exclusion of conditions associated with normal pregnancy violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must first determine
whether it is based on or related to sex, and if so, operates to disadvantage
women. The lower court assumed that exclusion based on pregnancy, which
only women experience, and which thus adversely impacts only women, is sex
related and discriminatory. While this conclusion seems obvious, Appellant
and Justice Stewart and the other dissenting justices strenuously contend that
pregnancy-based classifications are not sex-based discrimination. Thus, before
embracing the intuitively obvious, we must examine the issue in greater depth,
"being ever mindful of the historical context we outlined at the outset.
The capacity to become pregnant and bear children quintessentially distinguishes women from men. Thus, pregnancy is inextricably a sex-based
distinction - only women can become pregnant. Appellant contends that
this biological fact makes pregnancy unique and that as a result, pregnant
women simply are not similarly situated to men, and so classifications based
on pregnancy thus do not inevitably constitute sex discrimination. As Justice
Stewart puts it in his dissent, by excluding only pregnancy from the covered
risks, "there is no risk from which men are protected and women are not.
Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not."
417 U.S. at 496-97.
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There are several flaws in this reasoning. First, Appellant's and the dissenters' focus on the "uniqueness" of pregnancy, and their comparison of the physical risks women are protected from with those that men are protected from,
are irrelevant to the purpose and structure of California's disability insurance
program. As explicitly stated in California Unemploym ent Insurance Code S
2601, the program's broad purpose was to protect workers from the economic
hardship of periods of being physically or mentally unable to work, regardless
of the reason for the disability or the nature of the underlying physical condition that caused the disability. California's program simply was not structured
to protect workers only from some physical risks, and not others. The uniqueness of a physical condition to one sex or the other is of no import. Indeed,
with the notable exception of pregnancy, the program covers disabilities stemming from several sex-specific risks, including prostatectomies, hysterectomies, and treatment for endometriosis ..
The question whether the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities leaves
women similarly situated to men cannot be answered by facile resort to the
uniqueness of pregnancy. It must be answered solely with reference to the
purpose of the program, not to the nature of the underlying risk or cause of
the temporary disability. See Reed, 404 U.S. at 76. Thus, the relevant comparison to determine whether women are treated equally is whether women have
as comprehensive coverage as men do for all the normal and likely conditions
and risks that may render them temporarily unable to work. Using the purpose
of the insurance program as the frame for analysis, the relevant comparative
group is not, as the dissent proposes, the women-only group of pregnant persons versus the mixed gender group of non-pregnant persons. Rather, it is the
male-only group of workers who receive disability payments when temporarily unable to work due to any condition or risk that they might conceivably
face, and the group, including only women, who receive a much less compre·hensive level of protection, since women cannot receive insurance payments
when temporarily disabled due to a condition they commonly experience.
Normal pregnancy, like all the other conditions whose effects men are protected from, requires medical care, can lead to periods of sickness, hormonal
imbalance, hospitalization, and surgery such as episiotomies, and can require
periods of rest and absence from work in order to recover from its physical
and mental effects. Absences from work due to the effects of pregnancy and
childbirth can lead to economic hardship for women and their families. The
effects of pregnancy, physical and economic, are no different from the effects
of all the conditions for which men receive disability insurance payments. By
excluding pregnancy-related conditions, California creates a vast difference
in the comprehensiveness of coverage for men and women, and fails to treat
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the uniquely female condition of pregnancy the same as any and all conditions that render male workers temporarily unable to work. This constitutes
sex-based discrimination.
This framework of comparison for determining whether women workers
are treated equally to male workers is consistent with the interpretation of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency
charged with interpreting and enforcing Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. S2oooe et seq. (1970 ed. Supp. II), the federal statute prohibiting
employment discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of sex. The
EEOC has declared:
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion,
childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary
disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment. Written and unwritten employment policies and practices involving
matters such as the commencement and duration of leave, the availability
of extensions, the accrual of seniority and other benefits and privileges,
reinstatement, and payment under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan, formal or informal, shall be applied to disability due
to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are
applied to other temporary disabilities.
29 CFR S1604.10 (b).
The EEOC adopted this interpretive guideline for Title VII's ban on sex
discrimination in employment after carefully scrutinizing both employer
practices and their crucial impact on women. Based on this examination, "it
became increasingly apparent that systematic and pervasive discrimination
against women was frequently found in employers' denial of employment
opportunity and benefits to women on the basis of the childbearing role, performed solely by women." Br. for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 10.
While this case requires us to interpret the Constitution, rather than Title
VII, the EEOC's expertise in what constitutes sex discrimination in employment is highly instructive. The agency's conclusion that the failure to treat
pregnancy-related disabilities the same as all other conditions that render
workers temporarily unable to work constitutes sex-based discrimination bolsters our similar determination that California's exclusion of pregnancy-related
conditions deprives its women workers of equal treatment under the law.
In addition to using an irrelevant comparative framework focused on the
nature of the risk rather than the effect of the condition, Appellant's and the
dissent's focus on the "uniqueness" of pregnancy raises the question of why
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women should be deprived of workplace benefits for engaging in procreative
activity when men are not. Surely a better justification than the uniqueness of
women's way of procreating compared with men's should be required before
women are disadvantaged. Moreover, the assertion that pregnancy is unique
and that pregnancy's "uniqueness" removes it from the reach of the Equal
Protection Clause simply enshrines male biology, needs, benefits, and privileges as the supposedly objective norm against which all equal protection
claims for sex discrimination should be assessed. Pregnancy is "unique" only
because it is not something that males experience. The physical risks that men
are protected from- even those that are biologically unique to men- should
not become the sole yardstick for assessing whether women are adequately
covered for all the risks they might experience. While failing to accord women
who are similarly situated to men the same treatmen t as men can certainly
violate the Equal Protection Clause, see Reed, 404 U.S. at 76, it is not the only
type of gender-based distinction that can deprive women of the equal protection of the law. An equality doctrine that implicitly says that women can claim
equality only insofar as they are just like men is an impoverished concept
of equality, unable to protect women from the disadvantages they have long
suffered because of sex role stereotypes often based on their biological, reproductive "uniqueness." Being biologically different from men does not have to
mean that women should be disadvantaged or subordinated due to their difference. Women are entitled not only to equal treatmen t with men, but also to
equal opportunities for education, employment, and civic participation without barriers emanating from laws and policies that are based on stereotypes
about women's "natural" roles. See Pauli Murray and Mary Eastwood, Jane
Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.

(1965).
The way in which women contribute to procreation, by becomin g pregnant
and giving birth to a child, has accompanying physical risks that can lead to
a period of physical inability to work. The way in which men contribute to
procreation, by impregnating, does not have similar physical risks. Thus, a disability insurance plan that excludes physical conditions related to pregnancy
imposes an econom ic penalty on women who engage in procreative activity,
but imposes no such econom ic deprivation on men. As we intimated earlier
this term in LaFleur, when we found it unconstitutional to make unpaid maternity leave mandatory at a predetermined point during pregnancy regardless of
an individual's ability to work, laws and policies that deny equal employm ent
opportunities to women because of their procreative role can infringe on their
right to reproductive liberty. The present case makes it evident that denial of
equal employment opportunity to women because they are pregnant not only
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infringes reproductive liberty, but it also undermines equality between the
sexes. Men are not at risk ofloss of employment, disability protection, seniority, or economic security when they decide to procreate. Women too often are,
not because of the uniqueness of their procreative role, but because of the way
laws and workplace policies choose to treat that role. Laws such as California's
exclusion of pregnancy-related conditions from the disability insurance plan
place economic burdens on women for procreating that no man ever has to
face for his procreative activity.
For all these reasons, we reject as fatally flawed the arguments against regarding differential treatment on the basis of pregnancy as a form of sex discrimination. The focus on the unique biological differences between men and women.
distracts from the salient question of whether the state may enact laws that
make women's biological difference a justifiable reason for economic and
social inequality. The "uniqueness" of pregnancy does not exempt from the
scrutiny of the Equal Protection Clause the kind of policies and laws that single
out pregnant workers for adverse treatment. Indeed, pregnancy's unique association with women, and the long history of stereotypes about women's capacities
and proper roles that have led to so many forms of excluding women from the
workplace due to the capacity to bear children, make it all the more essential
to determine whether the sex discrimination effectuated by such policies and
practices violates women's right to equal protection of the laws.

v
Having concluded that California's exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities
from its disability insurance program constitutes discrimination on the basis
of sex, we must determine the appropriate standard of review for analyzing
whether this discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause.
California argues that as a social welfare program, exclusions from coverage
should be reviewed under the deferential rational basis standard of review.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,483 (1970). Under this standard of review,
absent a showing that the distinction involving pregnancy is a mere pretext
intended invidiously to discriminate against women, the state's lawmakers are
constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of this
social welfare legislation on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any
other physical condition.
The state's argument for the rational basis standard of review, however,
is inextricably linked to its rejected contention that the exclusion of pregnancy is not a form of sex-based discrimination. As our recent decisions in
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, and Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677, make clear, when a legislative
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classification is based on sex, as the exclusion of pregnancy in S2626 undoubtedly is, we must apply a standard of scrutiny more strict than the mere rational
basis review accorded to general social welfare legislation.
In Reed, we unanimously applied what an eminent constitutional scholar
has labeled a heightened rational basis test "with bite" to invalidate a statutory
preference for males as estate administrators over females. Gerald Gunther,

The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
12, 20 (1972). We ruled that the Equal Protection Clause denies "to States the

power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by
a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the
objective of the statute." 404 U.S. at 75-76. "A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.'" I d. at 76. We then conclude d
that the preference for men over women was rooted in irrational stereotypes
about the relative capabilities and experience of men and women, and bore
no relation to the purpose of achieving efficient administration of estates.
In Frontiero, a plurality of this Court went further, and declared that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or
national origin, are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to
close judicial scrutiny." 411 U.S. at 682. We reached this conclusion based
on our nation's long history of discrimination against women, noting that the
discrimination was often based in romantic paternalism and stereotypes about
women's capacity due to their maternal roles and household responsibilities.
We further noted that sex-based classifications, like racial classifications, often
bear no relationship to the ability to perform or to contribute to society, or to
the actual capabilities or needs of individual women and men. Id. at 686-87.
It is now time to take the next step in the natural evolution from Reed
to Frontiero, and definitively hold that sex-based legislative distinctions that
rest on stereotypes that constrain equal opportunity, or that cause or perpetuate economic or social disadvantage or subordination, should be subjected to
strict scrutiny. The need for heightened scrutiny is especially warranted when
a sex-based distinction affects the fundamental right to reproductive liberty,
as in the area of pregnancy, and the decision whether or not to bear a child
without government-imposed restrictions or burdens. See, e.g., Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632. The government must advance a compelling interest when it makes
a sex-based classification, and the classification must be necessarily related to
achieving that compelling interest.
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This does not imply that any sex-based classification or benefit or program
should automatically be invalid, or that the sexes must always be treated exactly
the same for all purposes. Mter all, while inequality can result from not treating
men and women as alike when they are, it can also result from treating men
and women as the same when they are in fact differently situated for a relevant
purpose. Heightened scrutiny does not mean blindness to the fact that differences between the sexes may warrant policies or practices supporting truly different needs, such as job-protected pregnancy leave, or opportunities to breast
feed at work, or to take breaks in order to pump milk. Nor would strict scrutiny
automatically invalidate laws or programs intended to facilitate participation in
the public sphere in order to alleviate historical discrimination. See, e.g., Kahn
v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). Laws aimed at overcoming structural impediments that have caused or exacerbated traditionally subordinated status or
denial of opportunity stemming from real differences or from stereotypes about
the import of differences may also be justified under a heightened standard of
review. Nor does strict scrutiny mean that widely accepted social practices resting on notions of privacy and safety, such as sex-segregated public restrooms,
which, unlike racially segregated public facilities, do not seem to subordinate
or stigmatize any group, would be invalid.
As we recounted at the outset of this opinion, the long history of women's
exclusion from equal opportunities in employment, education, and civic
participation - most often due to their reproductive capacity - demonstrates
the need to subject the purported justifications for sex-based distinctions to
searching examination, ever sensitive to the potential that stereotypes about
women's capacity and supposed natural role lurk beneath the law. There
is a persistent, deeply entrenched ideology in our society and legal system
that men and women are naturally suited to different roles and prefer to, or
should, primarily occupy different, separate spheres. The male sphere has
been the public world of the workplace, of politics, and culture, while the
female sphere is the private world of family and home. Ingrained stereotypes,
cultural attitudes, institutional structures, and legal classifications that seem
natural actually operate to entrench the separate spheres, thus constraining
and limiting the lives of women and men. The presumably well-meaning
celebration of women's unique role in bearing children has, in effect, denied
women equal opportunity to develop their individual talents and capacities,
and has constrained them to accept a dependent, subordinate status in society.
See Br. for the ACLU as Amicus Curiae. Women are often pushed out of the
public sphere of the workplace when they exercise their reproductive capacity, relegated to the home, dependency, and economic insecurity. The "male
breadwinner" ideology also limits men from more active engagement in the
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realm of the home and the joys and challenges of child-rearing, often to the
detriment of their emotional and physical well-being.
California offers two principal justifications for excluding pregnancy from
its disability insurance program. First, the state asserts that normal pregnancy
is a voluntary condition, and thus pregnancy does not conceptually fit within
a program to compensate for illness and injury. This argument is a variant
of the focus on the difference or "uniqueness" of pregnancy. Second, and
most prominently, California contends that the exclusion is based on cost
concerns, and the need to maintain the fiscal solvency of the disability insurance program and its current structure of employee contributions and benefits. California asserts that it would cost upwards of $120 million per year to
cover pregnancy-related illnesses, and this cost would soon overwhelm the
program, necessitating either sharp increases in premiums or drastic reductions in benefits.'B
The voluntariness of many normal pregnancies does not withstand scrutiny
as a real, rather than a litigation-inspired, rationale for excluding pregnancyrelated conditions. Not all pregnancies are voluntary or desired. And no
doubt the temporary physical disabilities that can accompany normal pregnancy are neither voluntary nor desired. Moreover, the comprehensive
disability program covers other temporary disabilities, illnesses, and injuries that result from numerous voluntary activities or medical procedures.
Workers temporarily unable to work because they choose to have voluntary,
non-medically-necessary cosmetic surgery or sterilization procedures are fully
covered. Workers temporarily disabled due to injuries incurred as a result of
voluntary and normal activities, such as playing sports and driving cars, are
fully covered. To single out pregnancy from all the other voluntary activities
covered by the program is arbitrary, and thus an illegitimate reason under any
standard of review.
· Turning to the rationale that it would be too costly to cover temporary
disabilities related to normal pregnancy, California asserts that based on
experience in other states, well over half of the payments from the fund
would have to go to cover these disabilities. While the precise amount
of increased cost cannot be verified, and Appellees contend that the cost
would be far less than California estimates,29 it is undisputed that benefit
,s This is substantially the same argument that the State advanced and the court accepted in
Clark v. California Employment Stabilization Comm'n, 332. P. :z.d 716 (Cal. App. 4th Dist.
1958), that is, that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities is necessary to protect the
.
solvency of the disability insurance program.
"'~ Appellant estimates the increased cost of including normal pregnancy at $1:z.o.:z. million to
$131 million annually, a 33 percent and 36 percent increase. Appellees estimate the increased
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costs will increase with an expansion of coverage. It is also undisputed that
California would likely have to increase the required level of employee
contributions above the current 1 percent, or would have to slightly raise
the current $85 cap on annual contributions, thus making the program
somewhat more costly for workers.
California also contends that because women workers generate a greater
rate of claims, women already receive a greater share of benefits from the
fund than men. Appellant submitted to the district court data indicating
that both the annual claim rate and the annual claim cost are greater Jor
women than for men. As the district court acknowledged, "women contribute
about 28 percent of the total disability insurance fund and receive back about
38 percent of the fund in benefits." 359 F. Supp. at 8oo.
This latter contention about women generating more claims and receiving a greater share of benefits cannot be California's actual reason, or a
legitimate reason, for excluding pregnancy-related disabilities.3° It is an argument based on actuarial principles, and California deliberately and carefully
structured its fund so as not to rest on actuarial calculations. For example,
workers' contributions are not set according to their level of individual risk
of incurring conditions that will generate claims, or the likely cost and duration of those claims. Contributions do npt rise for any group of workers
when their group generates a large percentage of claims. All workers pay
1 percent of their income up to $85 per year, regardless of individual or
group actuarial risk. Indeed, the program has a scale of benefits designed
so that its likely effect will be that those earning small incomes (a group
disproportionately composed of women workers, see Tr. of Oral Arg.) will
receive more in benefits than they qontribute. See Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code
S 2655. California conceded in the lower court that under its system, "the
right to benefits should not have any relationship to the amount contributed
to the fund." 359 F. Supp. at 8oo. Bec~use the purpose and structure of the
California disability compensation program do not limit benefits to various
groups based upon actuarial considerations, the state certainly cannot justify
limiting benefits for pregnant women on this basis.

JO

cost at $48.9 million annually, a 12. percent increase. California assumes that most women will
remain out of work for twelve weeks or longer after childbirth, while Appellees contend that
most leaves will be six to eight weeks, the time that the American College of Obstetrics and
Gynecologists estimates the average woman is physically disabled from working after childbirth. Br. for Appellees at 59-60.
Similarly, under the EEOC's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, "[i]t shall not be
a defense under title VIII to a charge of sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such
benefits is greater with respect to one sex than the other." 29 CFR S16049 (e).
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weeks rests on the same stereotypes about the physical frailty and incapacity
of all pregnant women that we recently rejected in LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 644.
Like the forced maternity leave at issue in LaFleur, the denial of benefits for
pregnancy-related disabilities seems to have its roots in the belief that all pregnant women are incapable of work for long periods of time, and therefore,
they will generate large disability claims.3' The truth of this belief is certainly
suspect. As we noted in LaFleur, while striking down mandatory maternity
leave for pregnant schoolteachers commenci ng well before and extending for
three months after delivery, not all women are physically affected by pregnancy in the same way and for the same duration. Many women will be fully
physically capable of returning to work within a few weeks after childbirth;
·
others will require longer leaves.
As the district court pointed out:
the treatment of pregnancy in other cultures shows that much of our society's views concerning the debilitati~g effects of pregnancy are more a
response to cultural sex-role conditioning than a response to medical fact
and necessity ... Indeed, a realistic look at what women actually do even
in our society belies the belief that they cannot generally work throughout
· pregnancy ... Nevertheless, the belief that pregnant women are disabled
for substantial periods results in their being denied the opportunity to work,
unemployment compensation benefits designed to aid those able to work,
and -because of the belief that they will submit large claims - disability
insurance benefits.
359 F. Supp. at 799 (citations omitted).
The sex-role stereotypes in operation are even more starkly revealed by an
additional argument advanced to substantiate California's fear that it will cost
too much to remove the pregnancy exclusion. The state argues that the pregnancy exclusion is necessary to prevent abuse of the program by women who
have no desire to return to work because they prefer to remain home with
their children. 359 F. Supp. at Boo. The state's argument depends on several
unsubstantiated assumptions: These women - presumably many or most will be able to find sympathetic physicians who support women staying home
with their babies, and who will certify them as disabled for as many weeks
as possible, so that the women can reap maximum benefits. Many of these
women will then never return to work. In other words, California argues that
l'

Indeed, as noted above, the starkly differing cost estimates of Appellants and Appellees stem
from differing assumptions about the length ofleaves that women will take. California assumes
leaves will average longer than eight weeks, while Appellees take individual's varying physical
and economic situations into account and estimate that most women will require shorter leaves.
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about women's role in reproduction as incompatible with workforce participation. This case highlights that barriers to women's full workforce participation
are caused not by women's biological differences from men, but by the way
our laws, governments, and employers choose to treat those differences.
The stay previously issued by this Court is vacated, and the judgment
of the District Court striking down the pregnancy exclusion in California
Unemployment Insurance Code S2626 is affinned.

